Congress restored, political and economic developments in contemporary India by Weiner, Myron & Joint Soviet-American Conference on Asia (4th : 1981 : Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

C/81-4
CONGRESS RESTORED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA
Myron Weiner
Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Prepared for the Fourth Joint Soviet-American Conference on Asia,
Tashkent, September 1981
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
August 1981

CONGRESS RESTORED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA
The elections of 1980 restored the Congress party to the preeminent
position that it has held since independence. Once again, the party has
an overwhelming majority of parliament, controls all but a handful of state
governments, and has a national leader who commands both domestic support
and international attention. In retrospect, then, can one view the emergency,
the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress party in the election of 1977,
and the emergence of an alternative government under the Janata party as a
brief (five year) break in what is otherwise a remarkable pattern of continuity
and stability in basic institutions and processes? Or were fundamental tensions
in the system revealed that foreshadow still another breakdown in the
parliamentary and democratic system? In an effort to answer these questions
I shall first examine the continuities in Indian politics by comparing the
elections and post-election scene of 1980-81 with the election of the last
Congress government in 1971, and by comparing both to earlier elections. Then
I shall consider some of the discontinuities, particularly by looking at the
ways in which the organizational structure of the Congress party has changed.
And finally, I shall discuss some of the major political economy challenges
likely to face Mrs. Gandhi or her successor-in the next few years.
I
How do the election results of 1980 compare with 1971?
1. In 1980 Congress won 351 Parliamentary seats with almost 43% of the popular
vote as compared with 352 seats and nearly 44% of the popular vote in 1971.
2In both instances the electoral coalition was similar. Congress won the
support of the very rich and the very poor, from Brahmins to ex-untouchables,
from well-to-do businessmen and government bureaucrats to tribal
agricultural laborers and Muslim weavers. In 1980, for example, Congress
won 50 out of 79 reserved scheduled caste constituencies and 29 of 37
scheduled tribe constituencies compared with 50 and 26 respectively in 1971.
In 1980 a centrist program won for Mrs. Gandhi and her party not the support
of the center, that is the middle classes and the.middle peasantry who were
either divided or opposed to Congress, but the extremes of the class structure.
2. Congress remains the party of choice among India's religious
minorities. Congress did well in the Sikh state of Punjab in both 1980
and 1971. It lost in Kerala, but in both elections Congress did best
in constituencies with large numbers of Christians. As far as Muslims
are concerned, in 1980 and in 1971 Congress won a low plurality of
seats in constituencies where Muslims form more than 20% of the electorate,
the strongest party among Muslims.
3. While its victories are based on the rural vote, the Congress position
in urban India is also secure. In the cities with a million or more population,
Congress won 25 of 39 constituencies in 1980, and 26 in 1971 and it did
well in the smaller towns.
4. Congress once again demonstrated in 1980 that it is a national party,
indeed, in electoral terms India's only national party. Congress won a
majority of parliamentary seats in all major states with the exception
of West Bengal and Kerala, improving its position over 1971 when it also failed
to win a majority of seats in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. There is no state
in which Congress is not either the first or second party. In contrast, all
other parties are limited to a single state or region. Janata is the most
3national of the opposition parties, but in votes polled it was the second
largest party in only nine states, with its strength mainly in the north.
Lok Dal is the second largest in Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and the largest
party in Haryana. The CPI(M) is the single largest party in West Bengal
and Tripura, and the second largest in Kerala. Four other parties, the
are strong in a single state each, While there is only one truly national
party, India actually has many party "systems", if by party system we mean stable
patterns. of competition among parties. Each state has its own party system,
unique ones in the case of Tamil Nadu, Kashmir and Punjab, and shared ones
in the case of some north Indian states.
5. In 1980 Congress won a majority in all but two of the ten states
which held state assembly elections. Similarly, Congress swept the state
assembly elections in 1972, winning 70% of all assembly seats, following
its parliamentary victory a year earlier.
6. Congress continues to remain weak among the middle peasantry,
particularly in northern India, as demonstrated by the electoral performance
of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Bihar where it won only
36%, 29% and 36% of the vote respectively. The Lok Dal , the party of the peasant
owner-cultivator class won 29%, 34% and 17% respectively in these states.
Lok Dal did well in this region in 1967 and 1971, but its position in 1980
has much improved and the corresponding strength of the Congress party within
this class has decl ined.
7. The Congress position within the urban middle class, never as secure
as it was among the lower income groups in urban areas, was also not as great
in 1980 as in 1971. Much of the intelligentsia is opposed to Mrs. Gandhi and there
are indications that the middle class in the largest cities voted against
Congress. In 1980 Congress lost a maJority of seats in the metropolitan
cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras (but carried Delhi).
4On each of these dimensions - the electoral coalition of the Congress
party, the position of Congress among the scheduled castes and tribes, the
Muslims, and in the urban areas, its geographic spread, the fragmentation
of the opposition, and the position of Congress in the states, the situation
in 1977 was an exception. Congress then, as is well known, dropped to 153
seats in Parliament with less than 35% of the vote. The lowest income groups
voted against its candidates. Congress won only 16 of 78 scheduled caste
constituencies, 12 of 38 scheduled tribe constituencies, and 20 of 81 Muslim
populated constituencies. In the urban constituencies Congress won only
7 of 39 seats. Congress was smashed in the Hindi-speaking states where it
voted against its candidates. Congress lost most of the scheduled caste,
scheduled tribe constituencies, and Muslim populated constituencies. In the
urban constituencies, Congress won only 7 of 39 seats. Congress was
smashed in the Hindi speaking states where it won only two out of 239 seats,
turning the party into a regional party of the south and west. In the state
assembly elections of June 1977 Congress lost all fourteen states. The
old electoral coalition behind Congress had fallen apart, the victim of the
emergency and the resulting unity of the opposition parties.
The breakup of the Janata coalition in 1979, and the victory of Congress (I)
in 1980 restored India to its normal political state: one national party,
and many opposition parties confined to a single region or single state,
with almost all of the parties further divided into factions. The 1980
elections and the post-election party splitting that followed produced a
veritable parody of the fragmented multi-party system. There are now two
Congress parties, two Communist parties, two Janata parties, two Lok Dals,
two Dravida parties, two Muslim Leagues, and countless small state parties.
The party names may differ, but once again opposition parties are
fragmented as they were in the 50s and 60s and .while there are
some electoral differences between the position of Congress and the opposition
5parties of 1980 and 1971 as compared with the earlier
striking how much similariyt there is. The electoral
Congress party from 1952 through 1980 show how stable
has been with the exception of the elections of 1977.
elections, Congress has never fallen below 40.7% nor
years, it is also
results for the
the vote for Congress
In the six other parliamentary
risen above 47.8%.
CONGRESS PARTY RESULTS IN SIX PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1952 - 1980
NUMBER
357
359
358
283
352
153
351
SEATS
PERCENTAGE
73
73
73
54
68
28
67
Faced wi-th a fragmented party structure, and factions within each of the
parties, including Congress, Indian politicians spend much of their time
trying to build political coalitions capable of winning elections and forming
governments - and undercutting exisitng coalitions. Central to any analysis
of Indian parties and elections is this fundamental principle: the political
necessity of coalition building transcends program, ideology, and class interests.
ELECTION
1952
195T
1962
1967
1971
1977
1980
VOTE
(in %)
45.0
47.8
44.7
40.7
43.7
34.5
42.7
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Thusfar we have focused on the similarities between the election and
post-election scene in 1980 and 1971 to emphasize the degree of political
continuity. We have already alluded to some differences - the greater weakness
of the Congress party among the Muslims, the divisions within the urban
middle class, and theweakness of the party in the Hindi-speaking states.
We might also note that the Congress position among the scheduled castes
is not as secure as it was earlier. But apart from differences in the composition
of the Congress coalition there is one other respect in which political
trends in the 70s and 80s differ from the first two decades after independence.
The first is theweaknessof the local organization of the Congress party and
(its corollary) the extent of centralization within the party. In the 1950s
and 60s power within Congress was in the hands of state party bosses who ran
traditional party machines based upon control over patronage. This pattern of
multiple power centers came to an end with the split in the party in 1969 when
Mrs. Gandhi, fearful that the party bosses might try to chose a new national
leader, former her own Congress party. Since it was the state leaders who
had challenged Mrs. Gandhi between 1967 and 1969 and whom she defeated when
they ran against her candidates in the 1971 and'1972 elections, she was eager
to prevent new independent centers of power from ever again rising.
Mrs. Gandhi restructured her party by centralizing it. State leaders,
including chief ministers, were no longer allowed to build an independent
local base in the countryside or in the party, but were appointed (or dismissed)
by the prime minister. As state party organizations and state governments
became increasingly subservient to the center, intra-party democracy within
Congress declined. Meetings of the All India Congress Committee and the
Working Committee became infrequent and their political importance reduced. Not
only did state governments become less independent, but even municipal governments
and village panchayats languished as local governments were often superceded
7and local elections became infrequent. Under these circumstances the local
Congress party atrophied. Mrs. Gandhi-may have reduced political threats to her power,
but in doing so she also weakened the local and state party organizations.
The result was that state governments became weaker and, between 1972 and
1975, the year she declared an emergency, less stable.
Many of the older functions of the Congress party - mobilizing local
support, accommodating itself to local factions, providing opportunities for
competing political elites, transmitting to state and central governments
information about the local scene - dissipated.
While Mrs. Gandhi's position within her own party has never been greater,
nor has the party ever been as dependent upon a single leader to sustain
its electoral support - Mrs. Gandhi continues to fear the emergence of any
independent center of political power. The reason has less to do with political
reality than her sense of personal insecurity and vulnerability.
The result is that none of the country's well known national and state leaders
have remained in Congress. Congress has become a one-person party (or as one
wit put it in 1980 when Sanjay was still alive, a one and a half person party).
Some former associates of Mrs. Gandhi in the Congress (U) have
returned to Mrs. Gandhi's Congress, and her son Rajiv, is said
to be interested in "consolidation", but there has been no major movement
back so far, and those who return will be leaders without followers.
Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet is made up of political unknowns, and cabinet members
know that if they attempt to build a political base of their own they will be
removed. The chief ministers she appointed were also little known and in
several cases she deliberately kept them weak by appointing their opponents
8to the central cabinet. She has avoided holding elections within the party knowing
that elections produce leaders with an independent political base.
It would be interesting to know what proportion of time is spent by various national
heads of state on politics apart from programs and policies. Surely the Indian
Prime Minister would be high on such a 1ist. It is not difficult to imagine
what kinds of issues have absorbed Mrs. Gandhi's attention this past year.
How should the government deal with the agitation in Assam against illegal
migrants from Bangladesh? (How about forming a new government with a Muslim
as chief minister?) How should the government respond to the agitation
of farmers in Maharashtra and elsewhere for higher procurement prices
and lower rates? (How about Pajiv organizing a pro-government rally in Delhi of
peasant cultivators?) What should be done about the agitation among students
in Gujarat against reservations for scheduled castes in the medical colleges?
(How about offering caste Hindus an equivalent number of new seats to compensate
them for those that are put aside as reservations?) What these issues share
in common is the sharp and often violent social and political
cleavages involving language, class and caste, and the extent to which the
Prime Minister must devote her attention to these conflicts without the
support and guidance of strong state party leaders.
No wonder the Prime Minister increasingly turned to her son Sanjay
and now to her son Rajiv. Succession is obviously central, but the prime minister also
needs a trusted advisor who can help deal with local and state political issues
that have increasingly become national.
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Now that Mrs. Gandhi is again in control of her party, two thirds of
Parliament, and all the major sta.tes except West Bengal, Kerala and Tamil
Nadu, how is she using her power? Not much, her critics, reply. She appears
to be spendingmost of her time on political matters, and the remainder on
hundreds of administrative decisions that cabinet members and officials
are reluctant to make on their own. There are some changes here and there -
fewer controls over investment and imports, some efforts to expand exports,
some efforts to deal with the bottlenecks in coal production, electricity,
rail transport, and the ports and more attention to industry than agriculture
compared with the Janata government. But there have been no significant new
policy directions. India today is very much an administrative state.
The government can, and has, expanded allocations for development. The Indian
bureaucracy is superbly equipped, technically and administratively, to do
project planning. Few bureaucracies in the third world can equal India's
in building a hydroelectric dam or irrigation project, or constructing
a fertilizer plant, a MIG factory or a plutonium reporcessing facility!
But the government seems ill-equipped to effectively coordinate investment
decisions (or allowing the market to deal with the resulting bottlenecks),
or to chart new courses. Pronouncements from the Prime Minister's office
are more likely to deal with the appointment of personnel than with new
policies. Though Mrs. Gandhi's government runs the largest development
program and the largest public sector in the non-communist world, she remains
remarkably unconcerned with questions of macro-economics.
There are plenty of issues that could be addressed by the Prime Minister.
The Economi-st recently assailed India for its autarchic development policies which.
have led successive ogvernments to encourage import substitution, favor capital over
labor intensive industrial development, nationalization of industry, and opposition
to foreign investment. The result has been slow industrial growth, slow growth in
industrial employment (especially since 1965), and protected and inefficient
industries that are less productive than their counterparts elsewhere.. Since
planners emphasize new industrial investment, maintenance is neglected;
inefficiencies in coal production and rail transport, and poor maintenance
in electric power plants have kept electric supply below demand, and slowed
the pace of industrial growth and employment. Agriculture needs more irrigation,
electricity, credit and in some places land redistribution if the boom affecting
the Punjab, Haryana and other green revolution areas is to spread to Bihar,
and Uttar Pradesh.
In short, India's critics - and friends - believe that India has the
potential to become a major grain producing and exporting country, that agricultural -
led growth would provide an increase in consumer demand that could stimulate
industrial productivity, that an influx of foreign investment would bring in new
technologies, and that a reduction in regulations and protection would stimulate
more efficient production. But all of this depends upon the pursuit of a
different strategy of development and the choice of new policies.
There is no evidence'that Mrs. Gandhi or any cabinet members or high
officials are rethinking fundamentals. Neither political constraints nor
ideological committments are the barrier, though both play a role.
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The simple fact is that Mrs. Gandhi is not a policy oriented person.
When new measures have been adopted - e.g. the nationalization of the banks,
or the end of the privy purses for ex-maharajas - they were for purely
political reasons. She has been prepared to relax controls, but has not shown
any inclination to rethink the question of the role of controls in the economy.
Mrs. Gandhi, as several observers have noted, is a leader with attitudes
rather than policies, with a point of view rather than a coherent ideology.
Politics, personnel, and administrative decisions is what draws her attention,
not the larger questions of what new policies should be pursued. It will
take a major economic crisis, not simply a change in cabinet personnel, to
force the government to rethink economic policies.
There are at least three major sets of economic problems that will force
the government to make politically difficult decisions in the next few years.
The first of these is the growing balance of payments deficit, the result
of rising oil prices, a slow growth in trade, and growing dependence upon
imports,.
The deficit in the balance of payments in 1979-80 was approximately
$3 billion and it doubled in 1980-81. If the deficit grows and the country's
exchange reserves are drawn down, India is likely to experience a foreign
exchange deficit as it did in the 1960s, though probably not of the same
magnitude. Under these circumstances policymakers will try to
reduce imports through import substitution, and encourage exports.
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Dependence upon external agencies for funding will grow. Invariably,
there will be disputes, particularly if the foreign exchange
situation becomes seriopus eno'ugh for international donors to press for devaluation,
the end of subsidies, or changes in policies. The question of private foreign
investment, relatively dormant for some time, has already been raised with
a decision by the government to encourage investment by OPEC countries under
more favorable terms. The need for an assured oil supply, for concessional
payment terms, and for barter agreements
will be important considerations affecting
India's policies in West Asia. One difficult choice for the Government of
India will be whether a grain surplus (food grain production is expected to
be 136 million tons in 1980-81 and it could increase to 160 million tons by
the mid-eighties) should be used to expand exports or used for a politically
popular food for work program. As the balance of payments deficit grows
officials in the central government will want to use food exports for oil
rather than for rural works programs while many politicians in the states
will pressure to continue these programs. Moreover, should India increase
its military purchases the case for exporting food to pay for imports will
be stronger.
The second political ecnomy issue is the disparity between the prices
of agricultural commodities and the soaring costs of agricultural production.
In the last few years, peasants have become more concerned with the price
and availability of agricultural inputs. Farmers want procurement prices for
their produce at a price that will cover the cost of their inputs and provide
them with a profitably return on their investment. As a class they want
better terms of trade with the city - cotton prices that are commensurate
with the cost of refined sugar, and so on.
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Higher procurement prices are not easily provided by the government
since they result in higher food prices which in turn generate protests
from industrial labor, the urban middle class, and the urban and rural poor.
Leftist supporters (and critics) of the government are divided, some discrediting
the middle peasantry by labelling them "kulaks" and "capitalist farmers" while
other see in their protest a revolutionary potential. For the government
all the solutions are painful. The country needs the energies of the middle
peasantry whose productivity is essential if the economy is to expand and
exports grow, but the government finds it politically difficult to pass on
the higher costs of production to consumers.
It is worth noting that it is the middle peasantry, not the landless agricultural
laborers or poor marginal farmers that have been politically aroused.
The prediction that the poor would not benefit from the green revolution
has proven to be false. Many small farmers have also adopted the new
technology, and more agricultural labor is employed where the new crops are
planted. The Janata food for work scheme further spread the benefits.
Inequalities have grown, but there has been a trickle down. In any event,
outside of West Bengal and Kerala the poorest agriculturalists have not been
politically organized as have the middle peasantry.
A third set of issues has to do with the growth of middle class
unemployment. Unemployment is linked to the high birthrates and declining
mortality rates of the 1960s and the slow industrial growth of the seventies
and early eighties. But the problem of unemployment should also be seen
in the context of expanding enrollments in secondary schools and colleges.
The result is a higher educational level among the unemployed. The combined
14
effect of rapid population growth and expanding education has been to create
not a middle class, but middle class aspirants in search of white collar jobs.
One safety valve has been the export of educated manpower. Nearly
a million Indians have migrated to advanced industrial countries, particularly
to the U.K., the United States, Canada and the Netherlands. Since 1973,
another half million Indians have found employment in the Middle East,
particularly in the Gulf states.
For the newly educated among social classes that have previously not
been educated, opportunities for overseas employment are more limited, while
the competition for employment within India is more acute. The problem
therefore, of educated unemployment is particularly severe in some of the less
developed regions. There is also an unemployment problem among the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes as their educational level has increased, although
they are partially helped by the system of reservations. And there is now
a growing demand from the sons and daughters of the backward castes,
many belonging to the middle peasantry, who have graduaged from the secondary
schools and colleges to search for non-agricultural white collar
employment.
The employment demands by the newly educated take a variety of forms:
for regional development, industries located in rural areas, and job reservations
that can assure their social group a share of pos-itions. The educated
unemployed do not, of course, form a single class. As members of particular
linguistic communities, castes, and tribes they turn to their community
for political support with the result that demands often take an ethnic form.
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The emergence of demands for reservations from the backward castes in
U.P and Bihar were the most recent manifestations of this phenomenon. There
are also signs of growing politicization among the emerging Muslim middle
classes whose demand for adoption of Urdu as an official language in various
states has employment as well as cultural implications. And the recent
backlash against reservations for the scheduled castes in Gujarat is an
indication that the improvement of the lower castes is now seen as an
employment threat to many members of the middle and upper castes.
In human terms the problem of unemployment among the recently educated
is probably less acute than the larger problem of unemployment among the rural
poor, but in political terms it is often more serious since the middle
classes are politically more articulate and have a capacity to rally large
numbers of people to their cause by appeals to ethnic solidarity.
IV
Mrs. Gandhi's government is thus faced with a series of gaps - between
imports and exports, between agricultural prices and the cost of agricultural
inputs, and between the rapid expansion of education and the slow growth of
employment. Each of these economic issues creates political challenges for
the government, particularly since policies to deal with the political problems
arising from these gaps create political costs. To give job reservations
to one community, for example, is to generate political hostility from another.
To help peasants is to hurt consumers. To invite more foreign investment
is to evoke the anger of left nationalists.
The government inay, of course, muddle through as governments often do.
Several good monsoons which still further increase agricultural productivity
would slow the inflation rate and might stimulate demand for and the production
of consumer goods. A more rapid development of offshore oil and an
16
improvement in coal production would ease the energy and foreign exchange
situations. If the agitations are confined to a few areas then ad hoc
political solutions may be possible. However, with the expansion of a market
economy in agriculture and the growing trade linkages between India and
the outside world the economic problems and the policies the government
adopts are often international or national, not regional or local.
If these economic problems grow, if they are accompanied by an increase in
agitations, if neither the center nor the states can find political ways of managing
these demands, if the level of violence increases, then within the bureaucracy,
the government and the Congress party there will be many to call for authoritarian
measures. (The American aphorism, "when the going gets tough, the tough
get going", seems appropriate.) In the mid-seventies a government led by
Mrs. Gandhi failed to muddle through and took recourse instead to authoritatianism.
It was the growing centraliztion of power within the Congress party from
1972 to 1975 and a corresponding decline in the organization and popularity
of the party within the states that set the stage for Mrs. Gandhi's decision
to declare an emergency. The reinstating elections of 1980 produced an even
more fragile system of authority than was produced by the elections of 1971
and 1972. Congress remains organizationally weak, and once again the Prime
Minister is reluctant to allow political leaders with independent popular
support to emerge in the states or in the center. At no time since independence
has the electoral standing of the governing party been so dependent upon
a single person's popularity. , The party desparately needs to have in the
wings a nationally popular vote winning personality. Hence the interest in
building up Rajiv. A combination of intractable-economic problems and a
fragile institutional structure for the management of political conflict
continues to make the Indian political system particularly vulnerable to
authoritari.anism.
Where is India going in the next few years? Shifting to the right?
To the left? Civil conflict? Another emergency? And economically - to
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an agricultural boom or a foreign exchange disaster? Who can say? Still,
some lines of development seem more likely than others.
-- It is inconceivable that a country as poor, ethnically diverse and
politically open as India will not experience some severe economic and/or
political crises - perhaps a drought-induced decline in agricultural productivity
one year, a worsening of inflation, and political portest movements by peasant
proprietors, landless laborers, industrial workers, backward castes, university
students, religious minorities, regional malcontents and other groups not yet
heard from.
-- So long as the central leadership prevents the emergence of powerful
state leaders, then instability in the states seems inevitable, and the center
must spend much of its time mending the state governments.
--Political turmoil in the Hindi states, particularly Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, eroded Mrs. Gandhi's position in 1974-75, and led to the emergency,
and in 1976-77, that led to her electoral defeat. She will keep a close
watch on this region, and so will her son.
-- India's most productive classes remain frustrated by the present set
of economic policies and they will press hard on the fringes for change. The
middle peasantry, the scientific/engineering community, the new entrepreneurial/
management class - all three the product of India's increasingly modernizing
economy, and the growth of her educational system - are impatient with
a leadership that is preoccupied with politics and a bureaucracy that remains
preoccupied with regulations.
-- There are no signs that this- government will be innovative, either in
domestic or foreign affairs. Its stance is a reactive one - to wait for a
crisis, then try to cope with it. There are no indications that the government
18
is moving to the "left" or to the "right", whatever those labels mean,
for so far there have been no indications of any significant policy movements
at all. New policies are likely to be crisis induced.
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TABLE 1
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1971, 1977, 1980
PERCENTAGE OF
VALID VOTES WON VAI Tfl VOTFS tAlON VAt Tfl 11flr1'z
SEATS
1977
PERCENTAGE OF SEATS
WON
1980
PERCENTAGE OF
VAID VOTES
Congress(I)
Congress(U)
Janata
Congress(0)
Jana Sangh
Swatantra
Socialists
Bharatiya Lok Dal
CPI
CPI(M)
DMK
AIADMK
Akali Dal
Independents
Others
100.0 ,. 539 100.0
PARTY
1971
SEATS
WON
352 43.7 153 34.5
298
351
16
22
8
5
2
53
43.2
13
31
27.6
10.4
7.4
3.1
3.5
3.2
4.7
42.7
5.3
18.9
23
25
23
. 5 . 1
7
3.8
21
2.8
4.3
I
14
41
11
35
16
18
8.3
9.4
2.6
6.0
4.5
4.7
8
2
14
19
10.5
1
8
16
10.5
TOTAL 518 3 525 100.0
TABLE 2
VOTE FOR CONGRESS PARTY, 1962 TO 1980
STATE
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Nagaland
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Delhi
TOTAL, India
1962
48.0
45.2
43.9
49.5
40.3
56.7
52.7
34.3
39.6
30.3
26.0
55.5
41.9
37.6
47.4
31.9
38.2
46.8
40.4
*44.7
STATE
(in percentages)
1967
46.9
45.8
34.8
46.9
44.1
48.3
50.5
49.0
36.2
40.8
48.3
32.7
33.3
37.3
39.9
41.7
58.3
33.7
39.8
38.8
40.7
1971
55.8
57.0
40.1
45.3
52.6
77.0
53.9
70.8
19.8
45.5
63.5
30.1
39.5
38.4
45.9
50.3
12.5
36.3
48.0
27.7
64.5
43.6
1977
57.4
50.6
22.9
46.9
18.0
38.6
16.4
56.8
29.1
32.5
47.0
45.3
48.3
38.2
34.9
30.6
22.3
39.7
25.0
29.4
30.2
34.5
1980
56.2
36.4
54.8
29.3
50.7
19.3
56.3
26.3
- 46.5
53.3
23.0
55.7
52.5
42.7
31.6
22.6
35.9
36.5
50.4
42.7
TABLE 3
"JANATA PARTY" VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980
(vote in percentages)
STATE
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
1971 a
12.1
11.6
34.0
48.6
25.6
17.7
13.1
24.2
Kerala 6.1
Madhya Pradesh 38.7
Maharashtra 12.5
Mani pur 14.2
.Orissa 50.6
Punjab 9.9
Rajasthan 31.3
Tamil Nadu 40.7
Tripura 0.5
Uttar Pradesh 38.0
West Bengal 12.9
Delhi 31.4
TOTAL, India 27.7
1980
JANATA LOK DAL
15,3 6.4
23.6 16.6
36.9 2.9
28.1 33.5
36.2 5.6
9.0 -
22.9 1.2
6.7 -
31.7 7.9
20.6 1.1
17.6 -
1977 b
32.3
35.8
65.0
49.5
70.4
57.2
8.2
-' 39.8
- 7.2
57.9
3..4
8.6
51.8
12.5
65.2
16.1
17.8
68.1
21.5
68.2
43.2
19.5
2.2
12.1
0.5
29.0
0.5
6.9
9.4
party, Bharatiya Kranti Dal,
the the Bangla Congress.
bCombined vote for Janata party, Congress for Democracy, and in Tamil Nadu the Congress 0.
TOTAL
21.7
40.2
39.8
61.6
41.8
9.0
24.1
6.7
34.6
21.6 -
17.6
33.9
12.2
'42.5
8.5
a
aCombined vote for Congress 0., Jana Sangh, the Samyutka Socialist
the Praja Socialist party, the Utkal Congress, the Swatantra party
51.6
5.1
44.8
28.3
14.4
10.0
-30.4
8.0
22.6
4.6
37.9
18.9
I
TABLE 4
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST) VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980
(in percentages)
STATE 1971 1977 1980
Andhra Pradesh .2.8 4.7 3.6
Assam 1.4 2.9
Kerala 26.2 20.3 19.1
Maharashtra 0.5 3.6 1.4
Orissa 1.1 2.0 0.9
Punjab 2.2 4.9 2.5
Tamil Nadu 1.6 1.6 3.2
Tripura 43.5 34.1 47.5
West Bengal 34.5 26.2 39.4
TOTAL, India 5.2 4.3 6.0
Note: All of the states where the Communist party of India (Marxist) ran candidates in 1971 and 1977 are shown. In 1980 the
CPI(M) also put up three candidates in Bihar (winning 0.9%), and one candidate in each of the following states: Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and U.P. Tripura, where the CPI(M) won its highest percentage in all three elections, has only
two seats in Parliament. For the distribution of CPI(M) seats in Parliament, see Table 1.
TABLE 5
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980
(in percentages)
STATE 1971 1977 1980
Andhra Pradesh 5.9 2.7 3.7
Assam 5.6 1.4
Bihar 9.9 5.6 7.3
Himachal Pradesh 1.7 1.4 2.5
Kerala 9.1 10.4 6.5
Madhya Pradesh 1.1 0.5. 0.6
Maharashtra 1.7 0.7 0.5
Manipur 15.0 11.5 9.7
Orissa 4.3 3.2 0.9
Punjab 6.2 1.7 1.3
Tamil Nadu 5.4 4.6 3.6
Tripura 6.8 2.2
Uttar Pradesh 4.4 1.1 1.6
West Bengal 10.3 6.5 4.4
TOTAL, India 4.8 2.8 2.6
Note: All of the states in which the Communist party of India ran candidates in 1971 or 1977 are shown. In 1980, the CPI
also put up one candidate in each of the following states: Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Delhi.
TABLE &
CONGRESS VOTE IN SCHEDULED CASTE CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND 1980
STATE
Andhra Pradesh (6)
Bihar (8)
Delhi (1)
Gujarat (2)
Haryana (2)
Himachal Pradesh (1)
Karnataka (4)
Kerala (2)
Madhya Pradesh (5)
Maharashtra (3)
Orissa (3)
Punjab (3)
Rajasthan (4)
Uttar Pradesh (18)
West Bengal (8)
Tamil Nadu * - ,
SCHEDULED
CASTE
63.4
20.4
34.2
37.8
27.7
32.0
55.3
27.3
38.4
39.7
41.1
30.1
32.7
22.5
31.6
65.7
1977
* In 1977 the Congress party contested 2 out
Congress party contested 3 out of 7 reserved
of 7 reserved constituencies. In 1980 the
constituencies.
STATE
57.4
22.9
30.2
46.9
18.0
38.6
56.8
29.1
32.5
47.0
38.2
34.9
30.6
25.0
29.4
22.3
SCHEDULED
CASTE
66.5
40.3
55.4
55.7
35.9
51.0
57.4
45.9
43.4
54.4
56.6.
47.2
50.5
33.8
38.2
58.6
1980
STATE
56.2
36.4
50.4
37.8
29.3
50.7
56.3
26.3
46.5
53.3
55.7
52.5
42.7
35.9
36.5
31.6
.6
TABLE 7
CONGRESS VOTE IN SCHEDULED TRIBE CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND
1977-
SCHEDULED
STATE TRIBE
Andhra Pradesh (2)
Bihar (5)
Gujarat (4)
Madhya Pradesh (8)
Maharashtra (3)
Orissa (4)
Rajasthan (3)
West Bengal (2)
57.2
23.7
52.0
34.6
49.7
43.6
21.6
37.4
STATE
57.4
22.9
46.9
32.5
47.0
38.2
30.6
31.7
47.8
35.6
55.5
52.3
57.8
53.6
51.0
32.1
TABLE 8
CONGRESS VOTE IN MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND 1980
(in percentages)
CONSTITUENCIES
20% OR MORE MUSLIMS
1977 1980STATE
STATE-WIDE
1977 1980 1977
DIFFERENCE
1980
Uttar Pradesh
(N*=23)
West Bengal
(N=24)
Bihar
(N=4)
Andhra Pradesh
(N=5)
1980
SCHEDULEDRIrD
BE TAT
1980
56.2
36.4
54.8
46.5
53.3
55.7
42.7
36.5
34.4 25.0 35.9
37.6
25.9
29.1
30.5
55.8
+0.9
29.4 36.5
48.7
-0.3
22.9
-1.5
+1.1
+12.336.4
52.4
+7.6
57.4 56.2 -1.6 -3.8
1977
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TABLE 9
CONGRESS AND ITS NEAREST OPPONENT
STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS, 1980
(Percentage of votes)
STATE
Bihar
Gujara-t
Keral a
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
CONGRESS( I)
32.4,
51.1
17.7
47.5
44.5
47.9
45.2
43.0
20.5
37.6
CLOSEST COMPETITOR
15.7 (Lok Dal)
22.6 (Janata)
19.4 (CPI-M)
30.3 (Bharatiya Janata Party)
20.8 (Congress-U)
19.6 (Lok Dal)
26.9 (Shrimoni Akali Dal)
18.6 (Bharatiya Janata Party)
38.7 (AIADMK)
21.6 (Lok Dal)
--- -- -- -- l -
TABLE 10
CONGRESS AND ITS NEAREST OPPONENT
PARLIAMENTARY'ELECTION RESULTS, 1980
(Percentage of votes)
CONGRESS(I) - CLOSEST COMPETITOR
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir*.
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
56.2
36.4
54.8
29.3
50.7
19.3
56.3
26.3
46.5
53.3-
23.0
55.7
52.5
42.7
31.6
22.6
35.9
36.5
15.3
23.6
36.9
33.5
36.2
37.1
22.9
19.1
31.7
20.6
17.6
19.5
23.4
30.4
25.4
47.5
29.0
39.4
(Janata)
(Janata)
(Janata)
(Lok Dal)
(Janata)
(Jammu & Kashmir National Conference)
(Janata)
(CPI-M)
(Janata)
(Janata)
(Janata)
(Lok Dal)
(Akali Dal)
(Janata)
(AIADMK)
(CPI-M)
(Lok Dal)
(CPI-M)
uncontested in Srinigar and
STATE
r *Srinigar and Ladakh are not included becauseJKNC stood
elections were not held in Ladakh during January 1980.
